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Platform for Privacy Preferences 
(“P3P”): Finding Consumer Assent to 
Electronic Privacy Policies 
Kimberly Rose Goldberg* 
INTRODUCTION1 
When consumers write a check at a grocery store, call home on 
a cell phone, mail tax returns, apply for a credit card, or buy 
concert tickets online, they share private personal information with 
a third party.2  In online transactions, once a consumer shares 
personal information for a legitimate purpose, i.e., buying concert 
tickets, that information is also likely to be used for illegitimate 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A. University of Iowa, 
1996.  I would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for his advice and comments on 
early drafts of this Note.  Thanks also go to Sam Moore and my husband, Barry, for their 
helpful remarks. 
1 When referring to online activity, the term “consumer” will be used throughout this 
Note to signify an individual Internet user, even though not all Internet activity involves 
consumer transactions.  This terminology is used to avoid confusion with the term “user-
agent” which will refer to a software program on a consumer’s personal computer. 
 The term “illegitimate use,” as defined for purposes of this Note, encompasses both 
illegal uses, such as identity theft, and legal but unauthorized uses, such as the 
unauthorized sale to a third party of an e-mail address that was collected legally.  
 Finally, the term “Web site” is used throughout this Note to refer not only to the Web 
site itself, but also to the business entity that owns and operates the Web site, whether it 
is a sole proprietor, partnership, or corporation. 
2 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Privacy: Tips for Protecting Your Personal Information, at 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/privtipsalrt.htm (Jan. 2002). 
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secondary uses.3  As the online collection of personal information 
expands exponentially, technology companies, consumer groups, 
and state and federal regulators are all escalating efforts to protect 
the privacy of personal data.4  Last year, the World Wide Web 
Consortium (“W3C”)5 introduced the Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (“P3P”).6  P3P is “designed to inform Web users of the 
data-collection practices of Web sites.”7  In broad strokes, P3P 
 
3 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS app. C, tbls. 1, 9a (May 2000) 
(providing results of a study that finds nearly ninety-nine percent of Web sites collect 
personally identifying information from consumers and about sixty-eight percent of those 
Web sites disclose that they do or may share this information with third parties), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/#2000 (last visited Nov. 30, 2003). 
4 See CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, S. 877, 108th Cong. (2003) (an anti-spam bill 
introduced by Senator Conrad R. Burns (R-Mont.) that is designed to protect against 
unsolicited commercial electronic mail, including prohibitions on misleading headings or 
fraudulent transmission information), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c108:S.877.RS: (last visited Nov. 12, 2003); Saul Hansell, 3 E-Mail Giants 
Will Join in an Effort to Reduce Spam, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2003, at C2 (discussing the 
announcement of a joint effort to cut down on spam by Microsoft, Yahoo, and America 
Online); Saul Hansell, Virginia Law Makes Spam, with Fraud, a Felony, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 30, 2003, at C1 (discussing legislation enacted by Virginia criminalizing the sending 
of fraudulent, unsolicited commercial e-mail); Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Publishes 
Agenda for Three-Day Public Spam Workshop, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003-
/04/spamforumagenda1.htm (Apr. 21, 2003) (The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
hosted a forum to “address the proliferation of unsolicited commercial e-mail and to 
explore the technical, legal, and financial issues associated with it.”); Ian Fried, In 
Privacy Debate, Tech Has Two Faces, CNET News.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-
1029-996405.html (last modified Apr. 10, 2003) (discussing various legislative and 
technology industry initiatives for data privacy protection, including an IBM lab project 
to create a layered health care database that allows access to certain patient information to 
only authorized personnel and protects against unauthorized access). 
5 The World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”) is a technology industry coalition that 
promotes Web interoperability by creating technology standards that can be used by all 
technology companies.  “W3C’s mission is to lead the Web to its full potential, which it 
does by developing technologies (specifications, guidelines, software, and tools) that will 
create a forum for information, commerce, inspiration, independent thought, and 
collective understanding.” World Wide Web Consortium, W3C in 7 Points, at 
www.w3c.org/Consortium/Points (last modified Jan. 15, 2003). 
6 See Fried, supra note 4. 
7 See Lorrie Cranor et al., The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3P1.0) 
Specification: W3C Recommendation § 1.1.1, at http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-P3P-
20020416/#P3P1.0 (Apr. 16, 2002) [hereinafter P3P Specification].  As of July 2003, 105 
of the top 500 Web sites have created P3P privacy policies. See ERNST & YOUNG, P3P 
DASHBOARD REPORT (July 2003) (finding a twenty-one percent P3P adoption rate in the 
top 500 domains), available at http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/US/-
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allows online consumers “to specify which information, such as 
names and shipping addresses, they are willing to automatically 
share with websites.”8  When a Web site seeks information that is 
not cleared, such as a credit card number or e-mail address, the 
browser displays a warning.9  P3P makes Web site data-collection 
practices more transparent to the consumer so the consumer can 
intelligently decide with which Web sites he or she wants to 
interact.10  P3P does not control a Web site’s actions;11 it merely 
dictates a uniform vocabulary, which each P3P-enabled Web site 
should use to describe its data-collection practices.12  Put another 
way, “P3P does not protect privacy in and of itself.  It does, 
however, help create a framework for informed choice on the part 
of consumers.”13 
P3P has received a mixed response.14  The P3P specification 
faces several technological and legal challenges,15 and even its 
 
 
P3P_Dashboard_-_July_2003/$file/E&YP3PDashboardJuly2003.pdf (last visited Nov. 
12, 2003). 
8 Fried, supra note 4. 
9 See id. 
10 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1 (“P3P provides a technical mechanism for 
ensuring that users can be informed about [Web sites’] privacy policies before they 
release personal information . . . .”). 
11 See id. (stating that P3P “does not provide a technical mechanism for making sure 
sites act according to their policies”). 
12 See id. § 1.1.3 (“The P3P vocabulary is designed to be descriptive of a site’s 
practices rather than simply an indicator of compliance with a particular law or code of 
conduct.”). 
13 Deirdre Mulligan et al., P3P and Privacy: An Update for the Privacy Community, 
Center for Democracy & Technology, at http://www.cdt.org/privacy/pet/p3pprivacy-
.shtml (Mar. 28, 2000). 
14 Compare World Wide Web Consortium, W3C Publishes First Working Draft of P3P 
1.0: Testimonials, at http://www.w3.org/Press/1998/P3P-test.html (May 20, 1998) 
(providing a list of favorable responses to P3P from technology executives), with ELEC. 
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRETTY POOR PRIVACY: AN ASSESSMENT OF P3P AND INTERNET 
PRIVACY, at http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html (June 2000) (providing a 
report that concludes “there is little evidence to support the industry claim that P3P will 
improve user privacy”). 
15 See LORRIE F. CRANOR & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, CAN USER AGENTS ACCURATELY 
REPRESENT PRIVACY NOTICES? 13–18 (Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
Discussion Draft 1.0, 2002), available at http://intel.si.umich.edu/tprc/archive-search-
abstract.cfm?PaperID=65 (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).  The authors discuss several 
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staunchest proponents admit that it is not a panacea for the privacy 
problem.16  Most significantly, the P3P specification has no 
enforcement mechanisms, resulting in little risk for Web sites that 
deviate from their stated data-collection policies.17  The Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed lawsuits against several Web 
sites under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTCA”)18 for making false privacy promises.19  Individual 
consumers might also file suit to recover for harm caused by false 
privacy promises or illegitimate use of data.20  Among the possible 
claims a consumer plaintiff could assert is breach of the contract 
created through the P3P transaction.21  Before the consumer can 
prove breach, however, he or she must first show that the P3P 
transaction in fact created a binding contract.  The very nature of 
P3P makes this difficult to prove, since the P3P transaction occurs 
between two computers with no human involvement.22  Humans 
 
 
possible legal challenges to P3P including the application of the mistake doctrine, 
confusion as to which terms bind, deception, defamation, and negligence. 
16 See Mulligan, supra note 13. 
17 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1. 
18 Federal Trade Commission Act [FTCA] § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2003). 
19 The FTC has settled the suits it filed against the following companies: Guess.com, 
Inc.; Educational Research Center of America, Inc.; Student Marketing Group, Inc.; The 
National Research Center for College & University Admissions; Microsoft Corp.; Eli 
Lily & Co.; various online pharmacies; Toysmart.com, Inc.; Toysmart.com, LLC; 
ReverseAuction.com; Liberty Financial Companies, Inc.; and GeoCities. See Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Privacy Initiatives, Enforcing Privacy Promises: Enforcement, at 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/promises_enf.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2003) (providing settlement information for cases the FTC has brought against various 
companies involving consumer information privacy violations under section 5 of the 
FTCA). 
20 Case law does not yet exist on the breach of privacy policy contracts. See Claude M. 
Stern & Carlyn Clause, Privacy Litigation, Breach of Contract, in KEVIN P. CRONIN & 
RONALD N. WEIKERS, DATA SECURITY AND PRIVACY LAW: COMBATING CYBERTHREATS § 
9:56 (West 2002). 
21 Other possible causes of action include violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, consumer fraud, invasion of privacy, trespass, unjust enrichment, false advertising, 
and negligence. See, e.g., Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 15–17; see also In re 
DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (plaintiff Web 
users filed a class action against DoubleClick for collecting a variety of personally 
identifying information from Web sites they had visited, as part of its Internet advertising 
business). 
22 See Stern & Clause, supra note 20. 
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cannot even read the privacy policy transmitted between the two 
computers.23  Arguably, the key to contract formation—a 
manifestation of mutual assent by the parties—is lacking. 
This Note explores the ways in which a consumer plaintiff 
might show assent to a Web site’s P3P privacy policy even though 
he or she was not involved in the actual transaction.  Part I gives a 
detailed explanation of the P3P transaction, while Part II 
introduces the problematic issue of assent.  Part III explores 
possible avenues of proving a consumer’s inferred assent to the 
P3P transaction.  The first section of Part III analogizes the 
consumer’s minimal participation in the P3P transaction to the 
conduct manifesting assent in click-wrap agreements.  The second 
section compares the non-activity of the consumer with some types 
of non-activity that manifest assent in browse-wrap agreements.  
The last section argues that even where there is no apparent 
conduct manifesting assent, the theory of standard form-
contracting may demonstrate the consumer’s inferred consent to all 
P3P privacy policies. 
I.   HOW P3P WORKS 
A. P3P Privacy Policies 
The P3P transaction is essentially a transaction between a Web 
site and the Web browser (i.e., Netscape Navigator or Microsoft 
Internet Explorer) on a consumer’s personal computer.24 Once a 
Web site decides it wants to make its data-collection practices 
more transparent to consumers by following the P3P specification, 
the Web site begins by creating a P3P privacy policy.25  The P3P 
privacy policy differs in several ways from the general privacy 
 
23 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1.  A human-readable version of the P3P 
policy is available, but the consumer-user must proactively request that the machine-
readable version be translated for viewing. 
24 See id. § 1.1.2 for an example of a P3P transaction. 
25 See id. § 1.1.5 (“Web sites can implement P3P[]on their servers by translating their 
human-readable privacy policies into P3P syntax and then publishing the resulting files 
along with a policy reference file that indicates the parts of the site to which the policy 
applies.”). 
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policy that is normally posted on Web sites for consumers to read.  
First, the P3P privacy policy is created in machine-readable 
language, which consumers cannot read.26  In addition, the P3P 
privacy policy is not a free-form text document.  To create a P3P 
privacy policy, Web site administrators complete a survey that 
serves as a template for the P3P privacy policy.27  The survey asks 
for general information such as what legal entity is responsible for 
the P3P privacy policy and what dispute resolution procedures are 
available to consumers.28  Further, for each element of data 
collected, the administrators must identify specifically what data is 
collected, how it will be used by the Web site, how long the Web 
site plans to retain the data, and which third parties can access that 
data element.29  Web sites collect data such as physical contact 
information (i.e., phone number) or online contact information 
(i.e., e-mail address), purchase information (i.e., credit card 
information), financial information (i.e., account status), computer 
information (i.e., Internet protocol address), Internet use data (i.e., 
Web pages accessed and searches performed), government-issued 
identifiers (i.e., social-security number), GPS location data, content 
from messages written by the consumer in an e-mail, chat room, or 
bulletin board, and, finally, demographic and socioeconomic 
data.30  The demographic and socioeconomic category includes 
age, gender, income, health information, and political, religious, 
and social affiliations.31  Once the Web site provides its responses 
to the survey, those responses are then translated into a P3P 
privacy policy and placed on one of the Web site’s servers where it 
is easily accessible by P3P user-agents.32 
 
26 See id.  The privacy policy is available in human-readable, as well as machine-
readable, form.  Machine-readable language is directly usable by a computer, and in the 
case of P3P is not human-readable.  A consumer, however, may obtain a human-readable 
version if she directs the user-agent to translate the machine-readable version into human-
readable form. 
27 See generally id. § 3.1.1 (providing a sample privacy policy in English and broken 
into the various P3P elements including policy, entity, access, disputes, remedies, base 
data schema, purpose, recipients, and retention). 
28 See id. §§ 3.2.2, 3.2.4, 3.2.6. 
29 See id. § 3.4. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
32 See id. §§ 2.1–2.2. 
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B. P3P User-Agents 
A consumer is able to access and browse the Internet through a 
Web browser.33  P3P is implemented in Microsoft’s Internet 
Explorer 6 (“IE6”) browser and Netscape’s Navigator 7 browser.34  
AT&T also developed a P3P product.35  P3P has two components: 
a consumer interface and a P3P user-agent.36  The interface is the 
mechanism through which the consumer is able to select his or her 
desired privacy settings.37  The consumer may choose to (1) 
restrict or limit the setting of “cookies”38 by Web sites; (2) release 
personal information only if the Web site’s practices comport with 
the consumer’s privacy settings; (3) be warned of any unauthorized 
use and to be asked for consent to that particular use; or (4) request 
a translation of the P3P policy into a human-readable version.39  
When a consumer visits a P3P-enabled Web site, the second P3P 
component, called a P3P user-agent, accesses the P3P privacy 
policy, and compares the data-collection practices stated in that 
P3P privacy policy to the consumer’s privacy settings.39  Based on 
that comparison the user-agent either allows the Web site’s data 
collection or restricts it.40 
 
33 A Web browser is a “software application used to locate and display Web pages.” 
See Webopedia, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/b/browser.html (last visited Nov. 
12, 2003) (Internet.com’s online encyclopedia of computer technology). 
34 See Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 8–10. 
35 See id. at 10–11.  AT&T’s P3P agent is the Privacy Bird.  It may be downloaded at 
<http://www.privacybird.com>. 
36 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1.1.2 (providing an example of the role of 
both these components in a P3P transaction). 
37 See id. § 1.1.1. 
38 Cookies are small text files that a Web site or telecommunications company places 
on the hard drive of a personal computer.  See generally In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy 
Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (explaining an Internet advertising 
service’s use of cookies to collect information from consumers); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 
165 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (explaining how cookies enable Internet 
information exchange “by allowing the interactions between a specific computer and a 
web server to develop a memory of the communications between the two parties”).  The 
cookie stores information, such as name, address, e-mail address, and telephone number.  
See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 502–03.  Once information is stored in a cookie, it 
can be uploaded by that Web site at any time. See id. 
39 See Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 5–11; see also P3P Specification, supra 
note 7, §§ 1.1–1.1.4. 
39 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1.1.4. 
40 See id. 
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What privacy settings are available to the consumer depends 
largely on the P3P user-agent he or she uses.41  For example, IE6’s 
user-agent focuses largely on limiting or restricting cookies.42  The 
consumer indicates general privacy settings by choosing one of six 
possible privacy “levels.”43  The lowest level is “Accept All 
Cookies,” and the highest is “Block All Cookies.”44  The levels in 
between are “Low,” “Medium,” “Medium-High,” and “High.”45  In 
general, these levels restrict data collection to various degrees 
depending on whether a site has a P3P policy, whether third parties 
are collecting data while the consumer is at that site, and whether 
the use of information is without the consumer’s implied or 
express consent.46  “Medium,” which is the default setting for IE6, 
restricts first-party cookies that collect personally identifiable 
information without the consumer’s explicit consent and restricts 
certain cookies from third-parties.47  Navigator 7’s privacy settings 
are similar to IE6’s.48  While IE6 and Navigator 7 use confusing 
technical language such as “Blocks third-party cookies that use 
personally identifiable information without your explicit 
consent,”49 AT&T’s Privacy Bird has a consumer-friendly 
interface.50  For instance, under the heading “PERSONALLY 
 
41 See id.  While the P3P privacy policy format is pre-determined by the P3P 
specification, those who develop the P3P user-agent have flexibility in how they design 
the user-agent.  Therefore, language, features, and privacy preferences may vary based on 
which company developed the P3P user-agent. 
42 See Microsoft Windows, Overview of Internet Explorer 6 Privacy Features, at 
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/evaluation/overview/privacyfeat.asp (Mar. 26, 
2003) (offering an overview of privacy features that discusses what cookies are and how 
Internet Explorer 6 (“IE6”) handles them). 
43 Microsoft’s privacy settings can be accessed through the settings menu on IE6’s 
browser: Tools > Internet Options > Privacy (“IE6 Privacy Settings”). 
44 See supra note 43. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. (providing a description of the criteria used to block or allow cookies under 
each of these privacy levels). 
47 See id. 
48 See Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 9–10 (describing similarities between 
IE6 and Navigator 7).  Netscape’s privacy settings can be accessed through Navigator 7’s 
browser: Edit > Preferences > Privacy & Security > Cookies (“Navigator 7 Privacy 
Settings”). 
49 See supra notes 43, 48. 
50 See Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 10–11 (describing the options available 
to users under the Privacy Bird). 
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IDENTIFIED INFORMATION (name, phone number, email 
address, etc.),” one privacy setting allows the consumer choose to 
be warned if a site will try to contact him by phone or by other 
means.51 
While the consumer merely selects his or her privacy settings, 
the P3P user-agent actually conducts the comparison between 
those settings and the P3P privacy policy.52  The consumer is one-
step removed from the process and does not read or respond to the 
P3P privacy policy.53  In fact, all P3P user-agents work 
automatically, meaning that the P3P user-agent operates at the 
default level until the consumer selects the privacy settings.54  As a 
result, the consumer’s awareness and knowledge of the privacy 
settings must play a significant role in the contractual analysis of 
assent.  It is through the selection of the privacy settings that the 
consumer has the best chance to prove that he or she assented to 
P3P terms, since that conduct objectively demonstrates the 
consumer’s acceptance of the allowed data-collection practices.  
On the other hand, where the consumer has not set his or her 
privacy settings, or did not understand what the privacy settings 
meant, the consumer is less likely to have assented to any P3P 
transaction. 
II.   THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUE OF ASSENT 
The P3P privacy policy is only read, evaluated, and acted upon 
by the computers on each side of the transaction.55  This lack of 
human participation creates a problem in a contract claim because 
both parties to a contract must indicate their agreement to the terms 
 
51 See, e.g., AT&T, AT&T Privacy Bird Tour, Privacy Preference Settings Panel, at 
http://www.privacybird.com/tour/1_2_beta/privacypreferences.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2003) (providing a sample privacy preference settings panel). 
52 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1. 
53 See id. 
54 The default setting for IE6 is “Medium.” See supra text accompanying note 47. 
55 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1.1.2 (providing an example of the interaction 
between two computers involved in a common use of P3P); see also Cranor & 
Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 8–10 (describing this procedure in IE6 and Navigator 7). 
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of the contract.56  It is well-established that “[m]utual 
manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by 
conduct, is the touchstone of contract.”57  Where written or oral 
manifestation is lacking, as in the P3P transaction, conduct may be 
as effective as words in manifesting mutual assent to a contract.58  
As long as the acting party knows that the other party will infer 
assent from that conduct, assent will be effective.59  Whether a 
party’s conduct manifests assent is a question of fact, and the facts 
and circumstances are viewed objectively.60 
Since the P3P transaction is automated and carried out in 
machine-readable language, consumers are unlikely to have direct 
knowledge of each P3P policy.  The formation of a contract based 
on the P3P policy likely will be based on inferred assent.  Conduct 
that creates an inference of assent is nothing new, but recent 
contract cases involving online activities have expanded the 
definition of conduct from which assent may be inferred to include 
the act of unwrapping a package, clicking on a link, or not 
returning an item in a timely fashion.61  The P3P transaction, 
however, challenges even this expanded definition.  The conflict 
arises when the fact finder must assess the consumer’s conduct for 
an effective inference of assent.  Once the consumer selects the 
desired privacy settings, the consumer no longer participates in the 
P3P transaction.  Computers perform all the necessary actions.  
Thus, the consumer has little conduct upon which to rest an 
inferred assent argument. 
 
56 See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Whether governed by the common law or by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (‘UCC’), a transaction, in order to be a contract, requires a manifestation of 
agreement between the parties.”). 
57 See id. at 29 (citing Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 551 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1999)). 
58 See Fed. Land Bank v. Houck, 4 N.W.2d 213, 219–20 (S.D. 1942) (“It is elementary 
that conduct may be as effective as words in manifesting mutual assent to a contract.  
Such agreements are said to be implied in fact. . . . [T]he facts are viewed objectively, 
and if a party voluntarily indulges in conduct reasonably indicating assent he may be 
bound even though his conduct does not truly express the state of his mind.”). 
59 See Binder, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
|§ 19(2) (1981). 
60 See Fed. Land Bank, 4 N.W.2d at 219–20. 
61 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
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III.   CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS 
A. Web Site Makes an Offer 
Before continuing with the contract analysis, one must 
determine which role each party plays in the transaction, since it is 
the offeree’s conduct that must be examined to determine whether 
there was an acceptance.62  The previous sections assume that the 
consumer is the offeree.  Indeed, the consumer is the party who 
must accept or reject the offer, but this conclusion is not as 
intuitive as it may appear.  An offer is the offeror’s manifestation 
of the willingness to enter into a bargain, which shows his or her 
commitment to the transaction.63  A mere statement of intent, with 
no commitment attached to it, is not an offer.64  The P3P 
transaction begins when the consumer’s browser sends a request to 
the Web site to send back to the browser all the information needed 
to display a Web page on the consumer’s computer.65  The Web 
site responds by sending the requested information.66  When the 
Web site is P3P-enabled, the Web site server also will indicate that 
a P3P policy is available.67  The user-agent then can request the 
Web site’s P3P policy or ignore it, depending on the consumer’s 
privacy settings.68  At first glance the consumer appears to be 
making the offer.  The consumer initiates contact by accessing the 
Web site.  Through his browser, the consumer offers to enter and 
browse the Web site.  The Web site accepts the offer, but only on 
the condition that the consumer agrees to the P3P policy.  Under 
the common law “mirror image rule,” however, this analysis fails, 
 
62 See generally ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 1-3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 3.2 (Joseph M. 
Perillo ed., 1993) (explaining that only the offeree has the power to accept an offer). 
63 See Day v. Amax, Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1983) (finding no 
manifestation of intent on the part of the defendant-offeror because the offeror was 
merely negotiating a sale, not committing to it). 
64 See Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1179 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (holding that 
no contract was created when plaintiff silver dealer submitted an application to the 
Federal Reserve to buy silver, and the Federal Reserve merely informed him they would 
respond to the application accordingly); see also JOHN CALAMARI & JOSEPH PERILLO, THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2.6(c) (4th ed. 1998). 
65 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, § 1.1.2. 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 See id. 
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since an acceptance that does not mirror the offer exactly acts as 
both a rejection of the current offer and a counter-offer.69  Here, 
the Web site’s acceptance did not mirror the consumer’s offer 
because conditions were added.70  Under the mirror image rule, the 
Web site is considered to have made a new offer that the consumer 
must accept or reject.71  Therefore, even when the analysis begins 
with the consumer as the offeror, he or she finishes the transaction 
as the offeree.  This is the correct outcome, but the “willingness to 
negotiate” analysis provides a more direct route to that 
conclusion.72 
The P3P scenario is analogous to a counter-intuitive line of 
cases holding that consumers make offers to retail establishments 
when they respond to retail advertisements.73  In this line of cases, 
retailers published advertisements for products at certain prices, 
but then refused or were unable to sell the products at those prices 
to consumers responding to the advertisements.74  The consumers 
argued that the advertisements were offers and that the stores 
should be held to the advertised prices.75  Courts ruled, however, 
that the ads were statements of a willingness to negotiate with the 
consumer, or at most an invitation to the consumer to make an 
offer.76 
 
69 See Pago Pago Aircrash v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 637 F.2d 704, 706 (9th 
Cir. 1981) (holding that a conditional acceptance of a settlement offer was not an 
acceptance, but rather a counteroffer).  Courts still adhere to this common law “mirror 
image rule.” UCC section 2-207, however, allows for conditional acceptance in a “sale of 
goods” transaction.  The discussion as to which is the preferable rule is outside the scope 
of this Note. 
70 See Pago Pago Aircrash, 637 F.2d at 706. 
71 Id. 
72 See Craft v. Elder & Johnston Co., 38 N.E.2d 416 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941) (unilateral 
offers through advertisement create no contractual relations); Steinberg v. Chi. Med. 
Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634 (Ill. 1977) (college brochure listing admission criteria was an 
invitation for prospective students to make an offer/application); O’Keefe v. Lee Calan 
Imps., Inc., 262 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (car advertisement was an invitation to 
make an offer).  But see Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 86 N.W.2d 
689 (Minn. 1957) (“first come first served” ad worked as an offer to the first person to 
respond). 
73 See cases cited supra note 72. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See, e.g., Craft, 38 N.E.2d at 419. 
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In the scenario presented in this Note, the roles are reversed 
because it is the consumer who browses the Web and decides to 
access a particular site.  The consumer directs the browser to the 
Web site and sends a request for the Web site’s information.  The 
request acts as an invitation to make an offer.  In the P3P context, 
the consumer is requesting an offer to use the Web site.  In 
response, the Web site makes an offer to use the Web site, subject 
to the P3P policy.  The Web site makes the offer by sending its 
P3P policy to the P3P user-agent, and the user-agent then decides 
whether to accept or reject the terms.77 
In both scenarios, the Web site is the offeror and the consumer 
the offeree.  Having established the role of the parties in the 
transaction, the following sections will analyze the consumer’s 
conduct to determine assent.78 
B. The Consumer Types 
This Note argues that, in cases dealing with automated P3P 
transactions, the consumer’s technological skill level plays an 
important role in the contractual analysis.  As noted above, a 
consumer may or may not be aware of the P3P technology, may or 
may not actively participate in the P3P transaction by setting his or 
her privacy settings, and may or may not know that a P3P 
transaction ever takes place between his or her computer and a 
Web site he or she visits.  The consumer’s level of familiarity with 
the P3P transaction will directly impact the analysis of his or her 
conduct when determining whether there was assent.  The 
consumer’s level of familiarity is directly related to his or her level 
of technical knowledge.  This Note suggests that a subjective 
approach be taken when examining the conduct of the consumer 
 
77 See P3P Specification, supra note 7, §§ 1.1–.2, 2.1–.2. 
78 This Note assumes the defendant Web site’s assent to the contract. See Stern & 
Clause, supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
A defendant company might attempt to argue that it never became contractually 
bound to follow its own privacy policy because the user never actually read and 
relied on the policy or otherwise manifested his or her assent to it.  It seems 
likely that a court would find that the defendant was estopped from denying the 
binding nature of its own promises, or was otherwise precluded on equitable 
grounds from making such arguments. 
Id. 
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for assent, to account for his or her technical skill and knowledge.  
This would be an exception to the objective standard that has 
dominated contract law for over one hundred years,79 but this Note 
concludes that such an exception is necessary in the age of 
automated transactions.80  When an electronic agent, such as the 
P3P agent, acts on a consumer’s behalf, the consumer’s intent to 
contract is less likely to be embodied in his or her own objective 
acts or conduct.  Rather, the electronic agent will perform those 
acts which would manifest assent under an objective theory.81  
With a subjective approach, the focus would be on whether the 
consumer believed that the terms of a P3P privacy policy were 
binding, not whether he or she memorialized his or her intent in 
outward words or actions.  Analyzing consumer intent subjectively 
will allow more consumers to bind Web sites to their stated data-
collection practices. 
This Note puts forth three categories that define consumers by 
their technical skills and knowledge: (1) sophisticated, (2) 
knowledgeable, and (3) unaware.  These categories are meant as 
guidelines to simplify the subjective analysis of a consumer’s 
 
79 Objective theory focuses on what the parties actually say and do to determine 
whether they entered into an agreement.  Subjective theory explores whether the parties 
felt, believed, or intended to enter into an agreement.  Judge Hand described the objective 
theory of contracts in Hotchkiss v. National City Bank of New York, 200 F. 287, 293 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911) (“A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties.  A contract is an obligation attached by the mere force of 
law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which ordinarily accompany and 
represent a known intent.”). 
80 Such an exception is in line with the requirement in most online-contracting cases 
that the consumer be aware of terms of an agreement for it to be binding.  The threat of 
unconscionability is too large when the consumer is not aware. See Cranor & Reidenberg, 
supra note 15, at 13–14 (“In essence, the validity of these agreements appears to turn on 
whether the users had effective notice of the terms and a real choice to accept the terms 
prior to the purported conclusion of the agreement.”). 
81 Electronic agency is the subject of significant scholarship, one federal statute, and 
two uniform laws. See, e.g., Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make 
Contracts?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 35–43 (1996) (discussing reasons to support the 
idea of conferring legal personhood on computers); Joseph H. Sommer, Against 
Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1145, 1176–86 (2000) (discussing electronic contract 
formation); Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act [ESIGN], 15 
U.S.C. § 7001 (2000); Unif. Elec. Transactions Act [UETA] (1999), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003). 
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intent and/or conduct.  They will be used in analyzing the contract 
theories below. 
1. The Sophisticated Consumer 
The more technologically sophisticated the consumer, the more 
likely he or she is to understand the terms of the P3P policy simply 
because he or she understands the technology and its 
consequences.  The sophisticated consumer is aware that privacy 
terms exist, knows that he or she is able to change his or her 
privacy settings—and thus the terms—at any time, and 
understands that by voluntarily accessing a Web site he or she is 
agreeing to those terms, which his or her P3P user-agent has 
accepted on his or her behalf.  More importantly, the sophisticated 
consumer clearly understands the technical language used by most 
P3P interfaces to describe the intended uses of his or her 
information, and therefore truly comprehends what information 
will be collected and how that information will be used.82 
2. The Knowledgeable Consumer 
A knowledgeable consumer knows the P3P user-agent exists 
and that a transaction occurs between the user-agent and a P3P-
enabled Web site.  He or she, however, does not actively 
participate by setting his or her privacy settings, leaving them 
instead at the default setting.83  Either the knowledgeable consumer 
does not care what his or her privacy settings are, or does not fully 
understand the implications of data collection and use.84  Whatever 
the reason, his or her inaction means that the P3P user-agent, not 
the knowledgeable consumer, has determined the types and 
amount of information that may be collected from the consumer.  
While the consumer is aware that terms exist, he or she probably 
 
82 See infra Part II for a discussion of the P3P transaction. 
83 For IE6 Privacy Settings, see supra note 43.  For Navigator 7 Privacy Settings, see 
supra note 48. 
84 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffery J. Rachlinksi, Standard-Form Contracting in the 
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 433, 436–37 (2002) (stating that even when 
consumers are aware of binding contract terms most are unlikely to examine the terms 
out of frustration, inconvenience, or apathy). 
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does not understand that he or she has the opportunity to “reject” 
some terms through the privacy settings. 
3. The Unaware Consumer 
The unaware consumer does not know P3P exists.  He or she 
does not know that his or her computer contains a P3P user-agent, 
or that the user-agent is acting on his or her behalf under pre-
determined default settings.85  He or she does not even know such 
settings exist and is thus unable to select privacy settings.  He or 
she is completely unaware that the browser’s P3P user-agent and 
the Web site enter into a P3P transaction. 
The next section will reference these consumer types while 
analyzing the applicability of some online contracting theories to 
the P3P transaction. 
C. Consumer’s Assent to P3P Terms 
Contracts relating to software sales or online activities have 
generally been upheld where the parties to the contracts are 
conspicuously aware of the terms at issue and unambiguously 
assent to the terms of those contracts.86  These holdings do not 
necessarily stray from the law of traditional paper contracting.87  
What has changed are the types of conduct that are accepted as 
manifestations of assent.  For instance, breaking shrink-wrap 
 
85 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
86 See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(discussing application of certain principles from the world of paper transactions to 
online activities to find a user’s notice of contract or license terms of a visited Web site); 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 84, at 488–90 (discussing reasonable notice in click-
wrap and browse-wrap agreements); Mark Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALR 
521, 528 n.29 (2003) (doubting the validity of browse-wrap agreements as a matter of 
law, unless the user is aware of terms); Cranor & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 13 (“The 
P3P standard contemplates an agreement predicated on notice and consent between 
the web site and the user over the use of personal information.”). 
87 See generally Mary Jane Radin, Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment, 75 
IND. L.J. 1125, 1133–36 (1999) (providing a comparison of shrink-wrap and click-wrap 
contracts); Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, supra note 81, at 1177–78 (rejecting the idea that 
contract forming machines are called electronic agents and stating that they cannot be 
agents “except by analogy”). 
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packaging88 or even continuing to browse a Web site after viewing 
the homepage may manifest a consumer’s assent.89  In click-wrap 
cases, if the consumer has notice of binding terms and must click a 
button on a Web page that indicates his or her consent to those 
terms, such conduct manifests assent.90  The next section examines 
whether any of the consumer’s conduct in the P3P context is 
similar enough to the conduct that manifests assent in click-wrap 
cases to be legally binding. 
1. Click-Wrap 
A click-wrap agreement typically presents the consumer-user 
with a screen that explains that use of the software product is 
subject to terms of the agreement; the consumer must affirmatively 
manifest assent by clicking “I Agree” before using the software.91  
Courts have overwhelmingly upheld these types of agreements.92  
These contracts are valid because the consumer is aware of 
 
88 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding software 
license terms are binding where the terms are located in the software packaging, even 
though the consumer will pay for the software before seeing the terms). 
89 See, e.g., Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981–82 (E.D. Cal. 2000) 
(finding that the plaintiff was bound to license terms because a barely legible link to 
terms of use resided on the home page, and plaintiff continued to access the site after 
visiting the home page). 
90 See, e.g., Moore v. Microsoft Corp., 293 A.D.2d 587, 587–88 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) 
(upholding a software license agreement where the user had to click an “I Agree” button 
before he could continue using the software). 
91 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 22 n.4. 
92 See Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010–11 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (holding that plaintiff had adequate notice of the forum selection clause included in 
the click-wrap agreement to be bound by it); In re RealNetworks, Inc., Privacy Litig., 
2000 WL 631341, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (finding a click-wrap license agreement was a 
“writing,” as required by the federal arbitration statute, because it was printable); Hotmail 
Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie, Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (holding 
that a breach of online terms of use was a breach of contract); Caspi v. Microsoft 
Network, L.L.C, 732 A.2d 528, 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (stating that there is 
no real difference in law between a standard form contract on paper and one in electronic 
form); Moore, 293 A.D.2d at 587–88 (holding a software license agreement valid where 
user had to click on an “I Agree” button before using the software); Barnett v. Network 
Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 203–04 (Tex. App. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had 
adequate notice of forum selection clause included in the click-wrap agreement because 
he had to scroll past the clause to get to the “I Agree” button). 
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contract or license terms and affirmatively manifests his or her 
assent to those terms by clicking the “I Agree” button. 
The relevant question in the P3P context is whether the 
consumer is aware of the P3P privacy policy terms at any time 
during the P3P transaction and whether the consumer does 
anything to affirmatively manifest his or her assent.  The unaware 
consumer will not benefit from this analysis at all, since he or she 
is not aware of any P3P terms.  The sophisticated or 
knowledgeable consumer, however, can argue that he or she was 
implicitly aware of the terms of a specific P3P policy.  The most 
sophisticated consumer will know the contents of the P3P 
specification.  He or she will know what questions are asked in the 
survey, as well as the range of possible answers from which a Web 
site may choose. 
Knowledge of the P3P specification can be imputed to each 
specific P3P policy because the P3P policies are all derivatives of 
the P3P template and use the same uniform language to describe 
data-collection practices.  A less sophisticated but still 
knowledgeable consumer with a basic understanding of cookie 
technology and P3P specification will generally understand what 
types of data are collected and how that data is used.  Either level 
of knowledge should satisfy the standard of awareness required by 
the large majority of click-wrap cases.93 
In Forrest v. Verizon Communications, Inc., the plaintiff 
argued that he did not have adequate notice of a forum selection 
clause at the end of a thirteen-page click-wrap agreement.94  The 
court found that the plaintiff had adequate notice of the clause even 
though it was in an unconventional location, was not capitalized or 
otherwise distinguished from the rest of the terms, and appeared 
inside a scroll box that only displayed portions of the license at one 
time.95  The court noted that provisions that were much harder to 
locate and read were upheld routinely in paper contracting cases.96  
The court had no reason to believe the plaintiff did not see the 
 
93 See cases cited supra note 92. 
94 See 805 A.2d at 1010. 
95 Id. 
96 See id. at 1010–11. 
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clause, since he relied significantly on the choice of law clause in 
the same agreement.97  The spirit of the awareness requirement is 
to ensure that the consumer does not enter into an agreement 
unknowingly.98  In the case of the sophisticated or knowledgeable 
consumer with enough expertise to understand the general terms of 
a P3P and to select his or her desired privacy settings, that spirit is 
not violated by assuming that consumer is implicitly aware of the 
terms of a P3P privacy policy. 
Further, when selecting his or her privacy settings, the 
consumer has the chance to restrict the data-collection practices of 
which he or she does not approve.  The corollary is that the 
consumer implicitly manifests his or her assent to the remaining 
terms by doing so. 
2. Browse-Wrap 
As one court explained, “a browse wrap license is part of the 
web site and the consumer assents to the contract when the 
consumer visits the web site.”99  The consumer does not have to 
click on the link to the terms of use to continue, as in with a click-
wrap agreement, and the link might even be obscured from 
view.100  Browse-wrap agreements are less favored by courts, but 
are typically upheld where there is adequate notice of the terms.101  
It is important to note that the consumer is not required to have 
 
97 See id. 
98 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 30. 
99 See Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 981 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
100 For instance, in Specht v. Netscape the link was submerged on the page from which 
the software was downloaded. See 306 F.3d at 30.  In Pollstar, the link was in gray print 
on a gray background. See 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
101 Compare Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com, Inc., Copyright L. Rep. (CCH)  
¶ 28,607 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2003) (distinguishing Specht from this case because the terms 
of agreement there were not plainly visible or known to defendants); Pollstar, 170 F. 
Supp. 2d at 974 (upholding a browse-wrap agreement where the text was small and gray 
on a gray background); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (upholding a browse-wrap agreement where the contract terms were visibly placed 
on the download screen); America Online, Inc. v. Booker, 781 So. 2d 423, 424–25, (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding a forum selection clause in an online terms of service 
agreement), with Specht, 306 F.3d at 30 (rejecting a browse-wrap agreement where the 
link to terms was obscured at the bottom of the download page). 
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read the terms of a contract for it to be binding, he or she only must 
be aware that binding terms exist.102 
A sophisticated or knowledgeable consumer who is aware of 
the human-readable version of the P3P policy has a valid argument 
under the browse-wrap doctrine that he or she assented to the P3P 
terms.  The human-readable version of the P3P policy is similar to 
the browse-wrap agreement, in that the privacy terms are 
constantly available to the consumer, but the consumer must 
choose to look at them.103  Under the rule of law in some browse-
wrap cases, the mere fact that a human-readable policy exists 
would be sufficient to hold all consumers to such contracts.104  In 
Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., the link to terms of use appeared in a 
gray font on a gray background on the homepage.105  Even though 
the court agreed that the link to the terms of use was not easily 
seen, it hesitated to “declare the invalidity and unenforceability of 
the browse wrap license agreement.”106  The court cited the 
discussion in ProCD v. Zeidenberg of the several types of valid 
paper contracts in which the consumer enters into a contract by 
using a service before receiving the terms of the contract (i.e., 
tickets for sporting events, cruises, or airlines), where terms are 
printed on the back of the ticket and the consumer does not see 
them until after he or she has already purchased the ticket.107 
Similarly, the consumer enters into the P3P transaction before 
viewing the P3P privacy policy, but like the browse-wrap 
agreement in Pollstar, the opportunity to view the terms is always 
there.  Any consumer who is aware that the browser has privacy 
settings will be alert enough to look in these settings for privacy 
information if so desired.  The privacy terms are always available 
to the consumer, and the knowledgeable consumer will be aware 
 
102 See Specht, 306 F.3d at 30 (stating that failure to read terms before signing a contract 
is not a legitimate defense). 
103 See Pollstar, 170 F. Supp. 2d at 981. 
104 See, e.g., id. at 982 (stating that even though the user was not immediately 
confronted with the notice of the license agreement this did not invalidate the browse-
wrap agreement). 
105 See id. at 980–81 (“Notice of the license agreement is provided by small gray text on 
a gray background.”). 
106 Id. at 982. 
107 See id. at 981 (citing ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
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that such terms exist.  Therefore, the human-readable option 
warrants a finding of the same type of assent found in browse-wrap 
agreements for the knowledgeable and sophisticated consumer. 
Finally, the consumer who actually reads the human-readable 
version of the policy has the best chance of proving assent to the 
P3P terms under the browse-wrap theory.  This situation would be 
closely analogous to the Internet consumer who actually browses 
the terms of use before he or she continues using the Web site and 
is fully aware of the terms governing the use. 
3. Standard-Form Contracting Theories 
It becomes apparent that the unaware consumer, with no 
knowledge of the P3P transaction, has fewer tools at his or her 
disposal than other consumers.  Much legal scholarship, however, 
has focused on the validity of standard form contracts, especially 
in the electronic contracting context.108  Some statistics show that 
ninety-nine percent of all paper contracts include standard, non-
negotiable forms, and that number will only increase as commerce 
moves online.109  Some of the theories that support the validity of 
standard forms also support the validity of contracts entered into 
without the knowledge or assent of the consumer.110  These 
theories might aid the unaware consumer in his or her quest to 
prove assent to the P3P terms. 
Mary Jane Radin, in her article Humans, Computers and 
Binding Commitment, discusses the ubiquities of standard form 
contracts and discusses several methods of standardizing electronic 
contracts.111  Radin describes all contracts as fitting one of two 
models: the contract-as-consent model and the contract-as-product 
model.112  The former is the traditional notion of a contract as 
embodying the mutual consent of the parties.113  The latter, 
according to Radin, represents the reality of a bulk of today’s 
 
108 See e.g., Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 84; Radin, supra note 87. 
109 Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 84, at 431. 
110 See text accompanying notes 111–129. 
111 See generally Radin, supra note 87. 
112 See id. at 1125–26. 
113 Id. 
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commercial transactions.114  The terms are part of the product; they 
are not scrutinized before the sale and are not negotiable.115  Even 
though this model does not comport with our legal sense of what a 
contract should look like, Radin claims that it is increasingly 
accepted by businesses, consumers, and even the legal community, 
and is becoming the exception that swallows the rule.116  
Electronic contracts in which terms are discovered, if at all, once 
the transaction is complete, are examples of these contracts-as-
products.117  Because commerce is moving online, and economic 
efficiency calls for electronic contracts to be binding, even where 
mutual consent is lacking, Radin explores possible ways to give 
legal legitimacy to these electronic contracts-as-products.118  One 
method is to correlate the use of a computer with consent to any 
transaction the computer is programmed to conduct.119  In the case 
of an unaware consumer, the very act of turning on the computer 
and browsing the Internet would constitute consent to the P3P 
transaction because the computer is programmed to automatically 
conduct this transaction when possible.  This theory comes with its 
own problems, many of which involve the validity of electronic 
agency.120 
Another method of achieving legal legitimacy for contracts-as-
product is the adoption of legal standards.121  Standards improve 
efficiency because transactions are easier when all parties 
understand the terms of the contract.122  Standards are created 
through legislation or through an industry push for a set of 
terms.123  Courts often hesitant to enforce standards that seem 
 
114 See id. (stating the “contract-as-product model may describe a great deal of modern 
commercial practice”). 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 1126–31. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. 
119 See id. at 1128. 
120 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing electronic agency). 
121 See Radin, supra note 87, at 1148. 
122 See id. (stating that “sets of standardized terms[] might reduce the transaction costs 
of the proliferation of different terms and uncertain enforceability”). 
123 See id. (stating that standards can be obtained by legislation, industry agreement, or 
by the emergence of a dominant format). 
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oppressive or monopolistic.124  Typically, standards imposed 
through legislation fare better in courts.125  Both legislators and 
industry groups continue to push for the terms of electronic 
contracts to be valid and binding without the requisite consent 
currently needed to enforce a contract.126  The results of these 
legislative efforts, including the Electronic Signatures in Global 
and National Act and the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act,127 
were created to address transactions much like the P3P transaction, 
where computers are engaging in commerce-related transactions 
without the consumer’s explicit consent, and often without the 
consumer’s knowledge.128  All plaintiffs, whether sophisticated or 
unaware, should use these legislative acts to their advantage in 
arguing that the P3P contract is valid as a matter of federal statute. 
Finally, the “blanket assent” approach to standard form 
contracts supports the P3P contract as binding.  Blanket assent is 
described as: 
Karl Llewellyn’s vision that the law should create a 
presumption of assent . . . to standard terms.  Llewellyn 
recognized that businesses generally compete to offer 
reasonable goods and services to consumers, and assumed 
that businesses, better than judges, could determine “the 
particular set of terms that ‘fits’ the practical problems and 
needs that arise . . . in carrying out the transactions.” . . . In 
sum, Llewellyn based his framework on the perspective 
that, so long as the terms are not unfair in presentation or 
substance, courts should presume consumers’ “blanket 
assent” to the details they may have ignored.129 
Under this approach, the consumer can effectively argue that 
he or she gave his or her blanket assent to all the terms of the P3P 
 
124 See id. (contending that industry induced standards can be looked at by courts as 
schemes imposed by private companies for their own interests only). 
125 See id. at 1149 (“Traditionally . . . courts have looked more favorably on standard 
terms achieved through legislation than on those achieved through industry self-
regulation or other market emergence.”). 
126 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
127 See id. 
128 Id. 
129 Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 84, at 455 (footnotes omitted). 
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transaction, even when he or she was not aware of them because 
the Web site would have created terms that were competitive, fair, 
and efficient. 
CONCLUSION 
No matter what level of technological skill a consumer 
possesses, or what theory the consumer uses to advance his or her 
cause of action, the issue remains whether and how a consumer can 
manifest his or her assent to the terms of a P3P policy that he or 
she never read.  Courts, legislators, and the legal and technology 
communities have proposed many solutions to the problem.  
Legislators and business entities want the realm of possible 
conduct to be broad enough to create the maximum number of 
binding electronic contracts.  Courts have tried to accommodate 
commercial needs without sacrificing the traditional concept of 
contract law, and scholars have constructed many arguments for 
tweaking the traditional contract law to encompass the nature of 
modern contracting.  None of these entities, however, in their rush 
to give electronic contracts the same weight as paper contracts, 
have done much to define the conduct necessary to manifest assent 
to terms that a consumer might not have had the chance to review, 
reject, accept, or modify.  Leaving theses standards undefined 
creates confusion and uncertainty for both Web sites and 
consumers.  As these cases play out in court, more definite 
standards likely will emerge.  One principal remains consistent 
throughout all of the doctrine and theories presented in this Note: 
all consumers are not created equal when it comes to technical 
skills and ability, and that distinction should be recognized by the 
adoption of a subjective approach to examining conduct which 
might infer assent. 
 
